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INTRODUCTION

The law of oil and gas in West Virginia, at its core, is the law of
contracts. This area of the law has its own vocabulary, almost as if the parties
are speaking a foreign language. But, like normal contract law, litigation in this
area is generally resolved by the specific language of the documents. And
because leases are used to convey rights pertaining to oil and gas, potential
conflicts are generally resolved by the lease itself.
West Virginia is in the midst of a potential economic boom. The recent
interest in developing the Marcellus and Utica shale formations has already
created great investment in the state. Although oil and gas has been produced in
West Virginia since the late 1800s,' most of the state's seminal decisions were
rendered in the early to mid-1900s. 2 As the industry has changed and
developed, language contained in the leases has likewise changed.
Of late, many oil and gas leases contain an arbitration provision.
Arbitration is a procedure in which a dispute is submitted, by agreement of the
parties, to one or more arbitrators, who make a binding decision on the dispute
instead of the conflict being resolved at a jury trial. Most leases use the
American arbitration system and mandate arbitration under the Federal
Arbitration Act ("FAA"). Some provisions also require tripartite arbitration
and a specified source for arbitrators. Other provisions require a unanimous
decision of the arbitrators for a valid award. The reasons to use an arbitration
provision vary and include: expeditious and economical dispute resolution (as
arbitration rulings have stringently limited avenues for appeal), a desire for
privacy, avoidance of a forum perceived to be hostile, and access to a tribunal
with special expertise in oil and gas law. Because lessors and lessees often have
differing views towards arbitration, mostly based on the waiver of the trial by
jury and the costs associated with arbitration, the ability for a party to compel
arbitration is being litigated.4
Under West Virginia law, arbitration agreements are presumptively
valid and represent the preferred method to resolve disputes. However, recent
opinions by the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia have called into

I

David L. McKAIN & BERNARD L. ALLEN, WHERE IT ALL BEGAN: THE STORY OF THE

PLACES WHERE THE OIL & GAS
SOUTHEASTERN OHIO: PART I, at 1 (1994).
PEOPLE AND

INDUSTRY

BEGAN:

WEST VIRGINIA

AND

2
See, e.g., Adkins v. Huntington Dev. & Gas Co., 168 S.E. 366 (W. Va. 1932); United Fuel
Gas Co. v. Smith, 117 S.E. 900 (W. Va. 1923); Jennings v. S. Carbon Co., 80 S.E. 368 (W. Va.
1913); Hall v. S. Penn Oil Co., 76 S.E. 124 (W. Va. 1912); Core v. N.Y. Petroleum Co., 43 S.E.
128 (W. Va. 1903); Parish Fork Oil Co. v. Bridgewater Gas Co., 42 S.E. 655 (W. Va. 1902).
9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2012).
4
See generally Heller v. TriEnergy, Inc., 877 F. Supp. 2d 414 (N.D. W. Va. 2012).

s

Id.
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question the validity of arbitration provisions in oil and gas leases.6
Landowners are attempting to invalidate old leases in order to sign new ones so
that they can get large bonus payments and increased royalties and avoid
arbitration. As a result, West Virginia courts are seeing an increase in litigation.
Current operators vigorously defend these suits in order to continue to produce
oil and gas in a stable economic and judicial climate.
This Article analyzes the law governing arbitration clauses in oil and
gas leases. Part II examines the notion that an oil and gas lease is a contract,
and in most instances, arbitration clauses should be enforced as they are
contained in bargained for agreements. Part III examines some of the most
common arbitrability issues governed at some level by state law. The Supreme
Court of Appeals of West Virginia has provided limited guidance on challenges
to the validity of arbitration clauses in oil and gas leases. Thus, this area of
West Virginia law is left to trial courts, and trial courts have provided
conflicting guidance on the continued validity of various lease forms under
different factual situations. To sustain West Virginia's development of oil and
gas, clearly defined rules are essential to provide comprehensible guidelines for
all involved. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia should recognize
the right to contract, the liberality of the FAA, and explain what constitutes
permissible arbitration language.
II. OIL AND GAS LEASE IS A CONTRACT
West Virginia law requires an agreement for the sale or lease of land to
be in writing.7 The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia has stated that
a lease is by definition a contract.8 All rights and protections are controlled by
the principles of contract law and depend on the proper construction. 9 "The
fundamentals of a legal 'contract' are competent parties, legal subject-matter,
valuable consideration, and mutual assent. There can be no contract if there is
one of these essential elements upon which the minds of the parties are not in
agreement."10 Mutuality of assent, or the meeting of the minds, is an essential

See, e.g., Dan Ryan Builders, Inc. v. Nelson, 737 S.E.2d 550 (W. Va. 2012); Crayiel v.
Appalachian Energy Partners, 736 S.E.2d 91 (W.Va. 2012); Brown v. Genesis Healthcare
Corp. (Brown II), 729 S.E.2d 217 (W. Va. 2012); Brown ex rel. Brown v. Genesis
Healthcare Corp. (Brown 1), 724 S.E.2d 250 (W. Va. 2011), rev'd, Marmet Health Care
Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201 (2012); State ex rel. Richmond Am. Homes of W.
Va., Inc. v. Sanders, 717 S.E.2d 909 (W. Va. 2011).
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 36-1-3 (LexisNexis 2012).
8
See, e.g., Ohio Fuel Oil Co. v. Greenleaf, 99 S.E. 274, 277 (W. Va. 1919).
6

Id.
Syl. pt. 9, Ways v. Imation Enter. Corp., 589 S.E.2d 36, (W. Va. 2003) (quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Syl. pt. 5, Virginian Exp. Coal Co. v. Rowland Land Co., 131 S.E. 253 (W. Va.
1926)).
9

10
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element of all contracts." In order for this mutuality to exist, it is necessary that
there be a proposal or offer on the part of one party and an acceptance on the
part of the other.12 Consideration has been defined as "some right, interest,
profit or benefit accruing to one party, or some forbearance, detriment, loss, or
responsibility given, suffered, or undertaken by another."' 3 A benefit to the
promisor is sufficient consideration for a contract.14 This Part analyzes the
effect of the express terms of the contract, common arguments made when
disputing the enforceability of an arbitration clause, and recent opinions by the
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia concerning arbitration generally.
A.

ProperAnalysis Looks at the Express Terms of the Contract

The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia has stated that a
"valid written instrument which expresses the intent of the parties in plain and
unambiguous language is not subject to judicial construction or interpretation
but will be applied and enforced according to such intent."' 5 Further,
[i]n construing a . . . written instrument, it is the duty of the

court to construe it as a whole, taking and considering all the
parts together, and giving effect to the intention of the parties
wherever that is reasonably clear and free from doubt, unless to
do so will violate some principle of law inconsistent
therewith.' 6
A court may look at the lease as a whole, including the consideration
provided, the circumstances surrounding its execution, the parties' bargaining
power, and the parties' conduct to determine the intent of the parties." "It is not
the right or province of a court to alter, pervert or destroy the clear meaning and
intent of the parties as expressed in unambiguous language in their written
contract or to make a new or different contract for them."' 8 Rather,

I Syl. pt. 4, Riner v. Newbraugh, 563 S.E.2d 802 (W. Va. 2002); Syl. pt. 1, Martin v. Ewing,
164 S.E. 859 (W. Va. 1932).
12
Syl. pt. 1, First Nat'l of Gallipolis v. Marietta Mfg. Co., 153 S.E.2d 172 (W.Va. 1967).
'3
Dan Ryan Builders, Inc. v. Nelson, 737 S.E.2d 550, 556 (W. Va. 2012) (quoting FirstNat'l
Bank of Gallipolis, 153 S.E.2d at 177) (quotation marks omitted).
14
Cook v. Heck's Inc., 342 S.E.2d 453, 459 (W. Va. 1986).
15 Syl. pt. 1, Sally-Mike Props. v. Yokum, 332 S.E.2d 597 (W. Va. 1985) (citing and quoting
Syl. pt. 1, Cotiga Dev. Co. v. United Fuel Gas Co., 128 S.E.2d 626 (W. Va. 1962)).
16
Syl. pt. 5, Hall v. Hartley, 119 S.E.2d 759 (W. Va. 1961) (citing or quoting Syl. pt. 1,
Maddy v. Maddy, 105 S.E. 803 (W. Va. 1921)).
17 Heller v. TriEnergy, Inc., 877 F. Supp. 2d 414 (N.D. W. Va. 2012).
18 Syl. pt. 3, Cotiga Dev. Co., 128 S.E.2d 626.
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[a]n unambiguous written contract entered into as the result of
verbal or written negotiations will, in the absence of fraud or
mistake, be conclusively presumed to contain the final
agreement of the parties to it, and such contract may not be
varied, contradicted or explained by extrinsic evidence of
conversations had or statements made contemporaneously with
or prior to its execution.' 9
B.

Arbitration

Courts favor arbitration where valid agreements exist that contain
arbitration provisions. 20 The FAA reflects the fundamental principle that
arbitration is a matter of contract.2 1 "A written provision in ... a contract
evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a
controversy thereafter arising out of such contract . .. shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract."2 2
"It is presumed that an arbitration provision in a written contract was
bargained for and that arbitration was intended to be the exclusive means of
resolving disputes arising under the contract .... "23 Both the Supreme Court of
the United States and the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia have
held that arbitration agreements should be enforced where the parties
knowingly entered into bargained-for contracts containing such provisionsparticularly where the parties have equal bargaining power. 24 The Supreme
Court of Appeals of West Virginia has stated:
A contract providing a procedure for arbitration of disputes,
and providing that: (1) all claims, disputes or other matters in
question arising out of, or relating to the contract shall be
decided by arbitration, unless the parties mutually agree
otherwise; (2) the arbitration agreement shall be specifically
enforceable under the prevailing arbitration law; (3) the
arbitration award shall be final; and (4) the judgment may be
entered upon the award in accordance with applicable law in

Syl. pt. 2, Kanawha Banking & Trust Co. v. Gilbert, 46 S.E.2d 225 (W. Va. 1947).
Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201, 1203 (2012); AT&T Techs, Inc.
v. Commc'n Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 650 (1986); Gateway Coal Co. v. UMWA, 414 U.S.
368, 377-78 (1974); State ex rel. Clites v. Clawges, 685 S.E.2d 693, 698 (W. Va. 2009).
21
Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2773 (2010).
22
9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012); see also Rent-A-Center, 130 S. Ct. at 2776.
23
Syl. pt. 3, Clites, 685 S.E.2d 693 (quoting Syl. pt. 3, Bd. of Ed. of Berkeley Cnty. v. W.
Harley Miller, Inc., 236 S.E.2d 439 (W. Va. 1977)).
24
Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 55-58 (1995); Syl. pt. 3,
Clites, 685 S.E.2d 693 (quoting Syl. pt. 3, W. Harley Miller, Inc., 236 S.E.2d 439).
19
20
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any court having jurisdiction thereof-, creates a condition
precedent to any right of action arising under the contract.25
Congress enacted the FAA to "reverse the longstanding judicial
hostility to arbitration agreements that had existed at English common law and
had been adopted by American courts, and to place arbitration agreements upon
the same footing as other contracts."2 6 As the Supreme Court of the United
States recently reiterated, the FAA "establishes a national policy favoring
arbitration when the parties contract for that mode of dispute resolution." 2 7
Accordingly, "questions of arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy
regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration." 2 8 And "any doubts
concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of
arbitration ....

29

The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia has found that the law
is clear that when confronted with a motion to compel arbitration, a trial court
has no authority to rule on any issue other than whether arbitration of the
claims is required. 3 0 The trial court's authority is limited to determining the
threshold issues of: "(1) whether a valid arbitration agreement exists between
the parties; and (2) whether the claims averred fall within the substantive scope
of that arbitration agreement." 1
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has stated
that a party can compel arbitration under the FAA by establishing: (1) the
existence of a dispute between the parties; (2) a written agreement that includes
an arbitration provision which purports to cover the dispute; (3) the relationship
of the transaction, which is evidenced by the agreement, to interstate or foreign
commerce; and (4) the failure, neglect, or refusal of a party to arbitrate the
dispute.3 2 In most oil and gas lease cases, there is no dispute that the first, third,
and fourth elements are satisfied. First, there is a dispute between the parties
and a refusal to arbitrate, as evidenced by the filing of a lawsuit. Second, a
contract related to interstate commerce is at issue, as oil and gas leases are
generally formed between citizens of different states for oil and gas exploration

25
Syl. pt. 3, Ruckdeschel v. Falcon Drilling Co., L.L.C., 693 S.E.2d 815 (W. Va. 2010)
(quoting Syl. pt. 2, W Harley Miller, Inc., 236 S.E.2d 439).
26
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991) (citing Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219 (1985)).
27
Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 349 (2008).
28
Moses H. Cone Mem'1 Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
29
Id. at 24-25.
30
Syl. pt. 2, State ex rel. TD Ameritrade, Inc. v. Kaufman, 692 S.E.2d 293 (W. Va. 2010).
31
Syl. pt. 5, Ruckdeschel v. Falcon Drilling Co., L.L.C., 693 S.E.2d 815 (W. Va. 2010).
32
A.T. Massey Coal Co. v. Int'l Union, UMWA, 799 F.2d 142 (4th Cir. 1986).
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using materials likely to be transported in interstate commerce.33 The issue in
most cases is the second element, or whether there is a valid written agreement
that includes an arbitration provision purporting to cover the dispute. 3 4
Recently, a number of oil and gas leases use a form that contains a
clear, unambiguous, and broad arbitration provision covering all disputes that
might arise between the parties. The typical language includes a requirement
that any question concerning the lease or performance thereof be determined by
three disinterested arbitrators. Lawsuits generally pertain to the lease itself,
the performance or failure to perform express or implied duties under the lease,
or to the circumstances surrounding the formation and alleged termination of
the lease. Many lessors attempt to dispute the enforceability of the arbitration
provision by arguing: (1) that the arbitration clause is unconscionable; and
(2) that the lessors were fraudulently induced to sign the lease which contains
unconscionable provisions.
In West Virginia,
[a] contract term is unenforceable if it is both procedurally and
substantively unconscionable. However, both need not be
present to the same degree. Courts apply a "sliding scale" in
making this determination: the more substantively oppressive
the contract term, the less evidence of procedural
unconscionability is required to come to the conclusion that the
clause is unenforceable, and vice versa.36
Procedural unconscionability involves:
inequities, improprieties, or unfairness in the bargaining
process and formation of the contract. Procedural
unconscionability involves a variety of inadequacies that
results in the lack of a real and voluntary meeting of the minds
of the parties, considering all the circumstances surrounding
the transaction. These inadequacies include, but are not limited
to, the age, literacy, or lack of sophistication of a party; hidden
or unduly complex contract terms; the adhesive nature of the

3
The question of what constitutes interstate commerce has been broadly interpreted. The
Supreme Court of the United States has described the FAA's "reach expansively as coinciding
with that of the Commerce Clause." Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265,
266 (1995). Moreover, "it is perfectly clear that the FAA encompasses a wider range of
transactions than those actually 'in commerce-that is, 'within the flow of interstate commerce."'
Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., 539 U.S. 52, 56 (2003).
34
See Adkins v. Labor Ready, Inc., 303 F.3d 496, 500-01 (4th Cir. 2002).
3s
Id. at 501-04; Heller v. TriEnergy, Inc., 877 F. Supp. 2d 414 (N.D. W. Va. 2012).
36
Syl. pt. 9, Brown II, 729 S.E.2d 217 (W. Va. 2012) (quoting Brown 1, 724 S.E.2d
250, 262 (W. Va. 2011), rev'd, Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201
(2012)).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2013

7

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 115, Iss. 3 [2013], Art. 8
1012

WEST VIRGINIA LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 115

contract; and the manner and setting in which the contract was
formed, including whether each party had a reasonable
opportunity to understand the terms of the contract.
Substantive unconscionability involves:
unfairness in the contract itself and whether a contract term is
one-sided and will have an overly harsh effect on the
disadvantaged party. The factors to be weighed in assessing
substantive unconscionability vary with the content of the
agreement. Generally, courts should consider the commercial
reasonableness of the contract terms, the purpose and effect of
the terms, the allocation of the risks between the parties, and
public policy concerns.38
Assuming the truth of the lessor's allegations regarding the formation
of the lease and that those allegations constitute procedural unconscionability,
even a sliding scale requires a lessor to identify a commercially unreasonable
term within the arbitration provision to support a finding of substantive
unconscionability. Lessors frequently dispute enforceability by asserting claims
concerning: (1) the cost-sharing provision; (2) the framework for the arbitration
process; (3) the relief available at law; (4) the waiver by both parties of the
right to trial by jury; and (5) fraudulent inducement or other unconscionable
principles. However, as detailed below, if a clear and unambiguous arbitration
provision that was bargained for is used, there should be no viable argument
that the arbitration provision is unconscionable.
1.

Cost-Sharing Provision

The cost-sharing provisions often require the equal sharing of
arbitration costs. "[T]he responsibility of showing the costs likely to be
imposed by the application of such a provision is upon the party challenging
the provision; the issue of whether the costs would impose an unconscionably
impermissible burden or deterrent is for the court [to decide]." 39 Lessors often
argue that an equal cost-sharing provision might force the payment of
thousands of dollars in up-front fees and costs before the start of litigation,
effectively precluding the vindication of rights or pursuit of claims in
arbitration. Courts have found this conclusory allegation, without more,

Syl. pt. 10, id. (quoting Syl. pt. 17, Brown 1, 724 S.E.2d 250).
Syl. pt. 12, id (quoting Syl. pt. 19, Brown 1, 724 S.E.2d 250).
39
Syl. pt. 13, id (quoting Syl. pt. 4, State ex rel. Dunlap v. Berger, 567 S.E.2d 265 (W. Va.
2002)).
3

38
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inadequate to show that the costs likely to be imposed with the application of a
cost-sharing provision are an unconscionably impermissible burden.40
2.

Framework for the Arbitration Process

Some arbitration provisions do not define a framework for the
arbitration process, omitting items like: the rules and procedures of arbitration;
discovery rights or remedies; appointment of mediators; the arbitrator's duties
and responsibilities; whether the evidentiary rules apply; the form of any
award; the scope of the award; what constitutes costs, fees, and expenses of
arbitration; and who should pay those items. However, courts have found that
the absence of these items does not render the challenged arbitration clause
substantively unconscionable. 4 1 Courts often reference section 5 of the FAA
which provides in pertinent part:
If in the agreement provision be made for a method of naming
or appointing an arbitrator or arbitrators or an umpire, such
method shall be followed; but if no method be provided therein
. . . then upon the application of either party to the controversy

the court shall designate and appoint an arbitrator or arbitrators
or umpire, as the case may require, who shall act under the said
agreement with the same force and effect as if he or they had
been specifically named therein; and unless otherwise provided
in the agreement the arbitration shall be by a single arbitrator.42
3.

Relief Available at Law

Some arbitration provisions fail to provide that arbitrators can award all
relief that might be available in a court of law.43 Invalidating an arbitration
provision on this basis, no matter the remaining incentives to arbitrate, would
"stand[] as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objective of Congress" in enacting the FAA and would be
preempted under the doctrine of conflict preemption.4 4 Accordingly, courts
have found standard arbitration provisions found in oil and gas leases not to be
substantively unconscionable on these grounds. 4 5

See, e.g., Heller, 877 F. Supp. 2d at 431.
See Blinco v. Green Tree Servicing LLC, 400 F.3d 1308, 1312-13 (11th Cir. 2005); S. Ala.
Pigs, LLC v. Farmer Feeders, Inc., 305 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1261 (M.D. Ala. 2004); Jones v.
GGNSC Pierre LLC, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1166-68 (D.S.D. 2010).
42
9 U.S.C. § 5 (2012); see also the discussion of § 5 infra.
40

41

43
4

45

See, e.g., Heller, 877 F. Supp. 2d at 431.
United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 109 (2000) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Heller, 877 F. Supp. 2d at 431.
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Waiver by Both Parties of the Right to Trial by Jury

It is axiomatic that "[w]hen parties agree to resolve their disputes
through arbitration, they concomitantly agree to not resolve their disputes by
going to court. "46 Accordingly, courts have found that arbitration clauses are
not substantively unconscionable merely because they include an express
waiver of *a jury trial provision. 47
5.

Fraudulent Inducement or Other Unconscionable Principles

[I]f a party seeks to avoid arbitration and/or a stay of federal
court proceedings pending the outcome of arbitration by
challenging the validity or enforceability of an arbitration
provision on any grounds that "exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract," the grounds "must relate
specifically to the arbitration clause and not just to the contract

as a whole." 48
In fact, "when claims allege unconscionability of the contract
generally, these issues are determined by an arbitrator because the dispute
pertains to the formation of the entire contract, rather than the arbitration
agreement." 49 Similarly, the FAA "does not permit the federal court to consider
claims of fraud in the inducement of the contract generally."50 Accordingly,
courts have found a plaintiffs claims of fraudulent inducement and
unconscionability that pertain to the contract as a whole are required to be
decided by an arbitrator and, thus, cannot preclude application of an otherwise
enforceable arbitration clause.5 1 The courts specifically state that because the
leases are bargained for, lessors are unable to identify an adequate state law
defense to the enforcement of the arbitration clauses contained therein. As
such, those clauses should be enforced as written pursuant to section 4 of the
FAA. 52

46
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Coe, 313 F. Supp. 2d 603, 615 (S.D. W. Va.
2004).
47
Id. (quoting Sydnor v. Conseco Fin. Servicing Corp., 252 F.3d 302, 307 (4th Cir. 2001)).

Snowden v. CheckPoint Check Cashing, 290 F.3d 631, 636 (4th Cir. 2002) (citation
48
omitted) (quoting Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 938 (4th Cir. 1999)).
49
Sydnor, 252 F.3d at 305 (citing Coleman v. Prudential Bache Sec., Inc., 802 F.2d 1350,
1352 (11th Cir. 1986)).
50
Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 445 (2006) (quoting Prima Paint
Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 (1967)).
5
Heller v. TriEnergy, Inc., 877 F. Supp. 2d 414, 433 (N.D. W. Va. 2012).
52

Id.
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The Brown v. Genesis Trilogy

In Brown I, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia held that
"[w]hether an arbitration agreement was validly formed is evaluated under state
law principles of contract formation."5 Generally applicable contract
or
estoppel, waiver, fraud, duress,
defenses-such
as laches,
unconscionability-may be applied to invalidate an arbitration agreement. 5 4
Brown I was a consolidation of three separate wrongful death lawsuits.
Each lawsuit arose from a nursing home's attempt to compel arbitration
pursuant to a clause in the nursing home's admission contract. The Supreme
Court of Appeals of West Virginia ruled that the arbitration clauses were
unconscionable and unenforceable in two of the cases, and held that the
Nursing Home Act55 could not be relied on to bar enforcement of the arbitration
clause in the third case. The Supreme Court of the United States reversed and
remanded, instructing the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia to
consider whether the arbitration clauses were enforceable under state common
law principles that were not specific to arbitration and thus was not preempted
by the FAA. 56 On remand, in Brown II, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West
Virginia (1) held that the doctrine of unconscionability explicated in Brown 1 7
was a general, state, common-law, contract principle that was not specific to
arbitration and did not implicate the FAA; (2) reversed the trial courts' orders
compelling arbitration in two of the cases and permitted the parties to raise
arguments regarding unconscionability before the trial court; and (3) found the
issue of unconscionability in the third case was not considered by the trial court
but could be raised on remand .
Since the holding of Brown II, lessors continue to argue that arbitration
provisions contained in oil and gas leases are unenforceable under West
Virginia law as they are both procedurally and substantively unconscionable.59
Lessors attempt to use the Brown II holding to argue that discovery is needed
concerning the formation of the lease. 60 Further guidance is needed from the
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia as to how the holdings in Brown I
and Brown II apply to arbitration provisions in oil and gas leases.

S3 Brown 1, 724 S.E.2d 250, 278 (W. Va. 2011), rev'd on other grounds, Marmet
Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201 (2012).
54
See id. at 281.
5
W.VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-5C-1-20 (LexisNexis 2012).
56
Marmet Health Care Center, Inc., 132 S. Ct. at 1204.
See generally Brown 1, 724 S.E.2d 250.
Brown II, 729 S.E.2d 217, 222-23 (W. Va. 2012).
59
See Heller v. TriEnergy, Inc., 877 F. Supp. 2d 414 (N.D. W. Va. 2012); Davis v. EQT
Prod. Co., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 179695 (N.D. W. Va. Dec. 10, 2012).
60
See Heller, 877 F. Supp. 2d 414; Davis, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 179695.
5
5
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III. STATE LAW
This Part examines some of the most common arbitrability issues
governed at some level by state law, including the threshold question of why
state law matters.6
A.

Why Does State Law Matter?

As discussed, the FAA reflects "a liberal federal policy favoring
arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any state substantive or procedural
policies to the contrary. The effect of the section is to create a body of federal
substantive law of arbitrability, applicable to any arbitration agreement within
the coverage of the Act." 6 2 Courts must therefore resolve any doubt about the
effect of an arbitration clause in favor of arbitration 63 so that the trial court can
have an adequate record.
By its terms, however, the FAA supplies only some of the rules of
decision for the analysis of arbitration clauses. The FAA requires that a written
arbitration clause "in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce

. . . shall be valid, irrevocable,

and

enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract."64 So in a case where state law would otherwise
supply the rules of decision, that state law continues-within certain limits-to
govern the analysis of whether an agreement to arbitrate exists, is enforceable,
and governs the dispute in issue: "When deciding whether the parties agreed to
arbitrate a certain matter . . . , courts generally . . . should apply ordinary state-

law principles that govern the formation of contracts."65
In some states, the source of that law is a combination of cases and a
codified arbitration act. Several such states have adopted the 1956 or 2000
version of the Uniform Arbitration Act; 6 6 others have enacted their own. 67 In

There are but a handful of reported cases dealing with arbitration clauses in oil and gas
leases. This discussion is therefore frequently supplemented by non-energy lease cases.
62
Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
63
See id at 24-25.
64
9 U.S.C. §2 (2012) (emphasis added).
65
First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995). Because post-formation
questions, however, do not fall within the savings clause, federal law requires that such issues
(like asking not whether a lease's arbitration agreement was ever formed, but whether a lease
containing an arbitration agreement has expired) are properly decided by the arbitrators, not by
the courts. See, e.g., Alexander v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC, 839 F. Supp. 2d 544 (N.D.N.Y.
2012); Beinlich v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC, No. 3:11 -CV566 (M.D. Pa. May 31, 2011).
66
See, e.g., Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 417.010-240 (LexisNexis 2005) (adopting Uniform
Arbitration Act of 1956); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. §§ 3-201 to 234 (LexisNexis 2006)
(adopting Uniform Arbitration Act of 1956); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-569.1-.31 (2005) (adopting
Uniform Arbitration Act of 2000); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 7301-7362 (West 2007)
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the remainder, there is no act; only case law governs. Codified or not, many
states sensibly attempt to keep their rules harmonious with analogous federal
rules.
The FAA and federal common law derived therefrom, though, always
remain in the background, poised to constrain application of arbitration-hostile
state law: "Th[e] [FAA's] saving clause permits agreements to arbitrate to be
invalidated by 'generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or
unconscionability,' but not by defenses that apply only to arbitration or that
derive their meaning from the fact that an agreement to arbitrate is at issue." 69
This federal pro-arbitration policy is so strong that the FAA precludes
application of any state rule "that stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of
the FAA's objectives." 7 0 Federal law thus preempts even a facially neutral state
rule on contract interpretation if it is "applied in a fashion that disfavors
arbitration"71 or "interferes with fundamental attributes of arbitration and thus
creates a scheme inconsistent with the FAA."72
The role of a court ruling on a motion to compel arbitration, then, is
quite narrow:
In ruling upon a motion to compel arbitration, the court first
determines whether the parties agreed to arbitrate the particular
type of dispute at issue. Answering this question requires
considering two issues: "(1) whether there is a valid agreement
to arbitrate between the parties; and (2) whether the dispute in
question falls within the scope of that arbitration agreement."73

(adopting Uniform Arbitration Act of 1956); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 171.001.098 (West 2005) (adopting Uniform Arbitration Act of 1956); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-581.01 to
-581.016 (West 2001) (adopting Uniform Arbitration Act of 1956).
67
See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§ 7501-7514 (McKinney 1998); OHIo REv. CODE ANN.
§§ 2711.01-.24 (LexisNexis 2000).
68
See, e.g., PaineWebber Inc. v. Hartmann, 921 F.2d 507, 510 n.3 (3d Cir. 1990)
("Fortunately, the federal [sic] Arbitration Act and the Pennsylvania Uniform Arbitration Act,
and the case law that has developed under each, are functionally equivalent as regards the
authority of a district court to review an agreement to arbitrate and to stay or compel arbitration .
... [B]ecause the relevant federal and Pennsylvania case law is so clearly established and has
evolved essentially in unison, we will refer to them interchangeably where helpful."), overruled
on othergrounds by implication by Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, 537 U.S. 79, 85 (2002).
69
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1746 (2011) (citing Doctor's
Assoc.,
Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996)); see also Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9
(1987).
70
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1748.
71
72

Id. at 1747.
Id. at 1748.

7
Carey v. 24 Hour Fitness, USA, Inc., 669 F.3d 202, 205 (5th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted);
accord Gay v. CreditInform, 511 F.3d 369, 386-87 (3d Cir. 2007) (cataloguing cases); Glass v.
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Given this narrow framework, a party seeking to avoid his promise to
arbitrate commonly will attempt either (1) to avoid application of the FAA
altogether by arguing, for example, that interstate commerce is not involved7 4
(questions ostensibly governed purely by federal law), or (2) to show that no
such agreement was ever formed or that if it was formed, it is unenforceable
(questions governed by FAA-constrained state law).
B.

Is the Dispute Severable?

Regardless of a state's rules on severance, the FAA requires that
arbitration clauses be treated as severable from their containing agreement.76

Kidder Peabody & Co., Inc., 114 F.3d 446, 457 (4th Cir. 1997) ("When faced with an arbitration
case, . . . the district court's role is limited to determining whether the contract to arbitrate is valid
and whether the dispute involved in the arbitration is within the subject matter of the contract to
arbitrate. Once having made those determinations, the district court's role ends and the Act
mandates that the district court enter an order of arbitration."); see also Stout v. J.D. Byrider, 228
F.3d 709, 714 (6th Cir. 2000) ("When considering a motion to stay proceedings and compel
arbitration under the Act, a court has four tasks: first, it must determine whether the parties
agreed to arbitrate; second, it must determine the scope of that agreement; third, if federal
statutory claims are asserted, it must consider whether Congress intended those claims to be
nonarbitrable; and fourth, if the court concludes that some, but not all, of the claims in the action
are subject to arbitration, it must determine whether to stay the remainder of the proceedings
pending arbitration." (citation omitted)).
74
But see, e.g., McCoy-Elkhorn Coal Corp. v. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency, 622 F.2d
260, 265 (6th Cir. 1980) ("It is beyond question that the sale of coal or other energy sources is in
the stream of interstate commerce."); Alexander v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC, 839 F. Supp.
2d 544, 550 (N.D.N.Y. 2012) (rejecting oil and gas lessors' argument that where land was
entirely within New York and no wells had been drilled, interstate commerce was not involved);
Kodak Mining Co. v. Carrs Fork Corp., 669 S.W.2d 917, 920 (Ky. 1984) (holding, for several
reasons, that coal mining lease involved interstate commerce).
7
State law on scope determinations has not proven an especially ripe area for parties
wishing to avoid arbitration. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Coviello, 233 F.3d 710,
713 n. 1 (3d Cir. 2000) ("[T]here is no meaningful difference between federal and Pennsylvania
law when reviewing the scope of an arbitration clause." (citations omitted)). As they should,
courts must apply their contract interpretation rules neutrally. See, e.g., Robbins v. Chesapeake
Appalachia, LLC, No. 3:12-CV-1788, 2012 WL 6012344, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 3, 2012) (holding
that putative tort claims of trespass and conversion were within oil and gas lease's clause
requiring arbitration of "[a]ny questions concerning this lease or performance thereunder"
(citation omitted)); Roman v. Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C., No. 3:1 1-CV-1614, 2012 WL
2076846, at *4-5 (M.D. Pa. June 8, 2012) (same); Twin Head Recovery v. JHJ, L.L.C., No.
5:09-CV-00572, 2010 WL 3361241, at *4 (S.D. W. Va. Aug. 20, 2010) (similar, and applying
Fed. R. Civ. P. 19-like analysis to require non-signatory to be party to arbitration because
of
relationship between his and signatory's claims to be arbitrated).
76
See Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 445-46 (2006) ("First, as a
matter of substantive federal arbitration law, an arbitration provision is severable from the
remainder of the contract. Second, unless the challenge is to the arbitration clause itself, the issue
of the contract's validity is considered by the arbitrator in the first instance." (citations omitted));
Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403-04 (1967).
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Thus, a party wishing to resist arbitration cannot merely argue that the entire
contract containing that clause is, for example, unconscionable under state law.
Instead, he must show that the arbitration clause itself is independently
unconscionable under state law. 7
Some courts, however, have distinguished the severability of state-law,
whole-contract formation challenges like illegality or unconscionability, which
must be referred to arbitration, from the severability of state-law contract
formation issues like lack of mutual assent, which, they hold, courts may
decide. In Eisenberger v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC,7n the district court
recounted two cases where it had followed the severance doctrine and referred
contract-as-a-whole challenges to arbitration. 79 Nevertheless, the court
adjudicated a challenge to the formation of the entire contract based on lack of
offer and acceptance:
Unlike [the earlier cases], this Court can see a reason to
distinguish between claims of illegality, fraud, duress, and
unconscionability on the one hand, and claims that there was
never an offer and acceptance on the other. In the former, there
was a meeting of the minds between the parties on at least
some provisions in the contract, including the arbitration
agreement, and therefore it is reasonable for both parties to
have anticipated submission to arbitration. In the latter, there
was no agreement regarding any of the provisions of the
contract and it would be unfair to force a party into an
arbitration that was never agreed to, thereby denying them
access to the courts.o
Similarly, in Cleveland v. Taylor,8 1 the Texas Court of Appeals held
that a person who could not produce an agreement signed by the parties against
whom it was to be enforced, arguing only that that agreement contained an
arbitration agreement, was not entitled to compel arbitration of any issue. 8 2

n
78

Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc., 546 U.S. at 445-46 (2006).
No. 3:09-CV-1415, 2010 WL 457139 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 4, 2010).

79
See id. (discussing Ulmer v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC, No. 4:08-CV-2062, 2009 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 124650, at *1, *8-9 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 16, 2009) (compelling arbitration where plaintiff
sought declaratory judgment that oil and gas lease be declared void because
it
violated
Pennsylvania's minimum royalty rate)); Hayes v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC, No.
3:09-CV-619, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124653, at *1-2, *6 (M.D. Pa. May 15, 2009) (compelling
arbitration where Plaintiffs sought "to have court declare lease void because statutorily mandated
one-eighth royalty payment for gas recovered" should not be subject to deduction of postproduction costs (citations omitted)).
8o
Id. at *4.
81
No. 01-1 1-00227-CV, 2012 WL 2455170 (Tex. Ct. App. June 28, 2012).
82
Id. at *7.
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How Will ArbitrationBe Conducted?

Parties wishing to avoid arbitration commonly point to problems with
the chosen arbitration forum or selected arbitration rules as a reason not to
enforce arbitration at all. Claims that the chosen professional arbitrators no
longer accept cases of the type at issue, for example, are becoming popular.
Unless the chosen arbitrator is "integral" to the parties' bargain,
however, the FAA has an express solution to the unavailability of the named
arbitrator:
As the Eleventh Circuit has articulated the standard: "Only if
the choice of forum is an integral part of the agreement to
arbitrate, rather than an 'ancillary logistical concern,' will the
failure of the chosen forum preclude arbitration." In other
words, a court will decline to appoint a substitute arbitrator, as
provided in the FAA, only if the parties' choice of forum is "so
central to the arbitration agreement that the unavailability of
that arbitrator [brings] the agreement to an end." In this light,
the parties must have unambiguously expressed their intent not
to arbitrate their disputes in the event that the designated
arbitral forum is unavailable.).
"To take a narrower construction of Section 5 [of the FAA]," the Third Circuit
concluded, "would be inconsistent with the 'liberal federal policy in favor of
arbitration' articulated in the FAA."84
D.

Is It "Arbitration"?

For the purposes of applying their own arbitration-specific laws, states
follow their own rules to decide whether an agreement was an agreement to
arbitrate or something else. In Unit Collieries,Inc. v. Rogers,85 for example, the

8
Khan v. Dell Inc., 669 F.3d 350, 354 (3d Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). See also, e.g., 9
U.S.C. § 5 (2012) (providing for court appointment of substitute arbitrator); Montgomery v.
Applied Bank, 848 F. Supp. 2d 609, 613-14 (S.D. W. Va. 2012) (rejecting unavailable forum
challenge and applying § 5). But see In re Salomon Inc. S'holders' Derivative Litig., 68 F.3d
554, 559-61 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that § 5 does not apply to unavailability of arbitrator). The
Third, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits and district courts in several other circuits, at least,
have declined to adopt In re Salomon's position.
84
Khan, 669 F.3d at 356. A few courts have concluded that the mere selection of a particular
forum is enough to find that selection "integral." See, e.g., Stewart v. GGNSC-Canonsburg, L.P.,
9 A.3d 215, 219-21 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2010). That position is not well-reasoned and, more
importantly, is inconsistent with the FAA's broad policy. In fact, at least one of the cases on
which the Stewart court based its conclusion-Khan v. Dell, Inc., No. 09-CV-3703, 2010 WL
3283529 (D.N.J. Aug. 18, 2010), vacated sub nom. Khan, 669 F.3d 350-was subsequently
vacated on precisely that issue. See Khan, 669 F.3d 350.
85 No. 2009-CA-001328-MR, 2010 WL 4137442 (Ky. Ct. App., Oct. 22, 2010).
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Kentucky Court of Appeals held that a clause in a "lease [that] does not
explicitly contain the word 'arbitration,' but [that] describe[s] and constitute[s]
that very procedure" 86 was indeed an agreement to arbitrate, and so Kentucky's
arbitration act applied.

But in Steiner v. Appalachian Exploration,Inc., 8 the

Ohio Court of Appeals held that "[i]n an oil and gas lease which requires the
lessee to pay damages to growing crops caused by its operations, a provision
calling for damages not agreed upon to be ascertained by a panel of
disinterested persons is a contract for appraisal, not for arbitration." 89 The
court, therefore, applied Ohio's rule on setting aside an appraisal rather than its
rule on setting aside an arbitral award. 90
The question, however, of whether an agreement constitutes "[a]
written provision . .. to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising ...
or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy 9 1 is
undoubtedly one of federal statutory interpretation and, thus, purely a question
of federal common law. So even if state law requires that a case does not
involve "arbitration" for the purposes of applying that state's remaining
arbitration law, the FAA's requirements would nonetheless still apply if, by
federal common law, the agreement was indeed one to arbitrate.
E.

Who May Compel or Be Compelled by Another To Arbitrate?

"[A] gateway dispute about whether the parties are bound by a given
arbitration clause raises a 'question of arbitrability' for a court to decide."92
And in diversity cases, state law will typically supply that governing law. 9 3
Id. at *1.
Id. at *2 (citing City of Covington v. Limerick, 40 S.W. 254, 256 (Ky. 1897) (holding that
"a stipulation in a contract . .. that the engineer shall be the sole judge of the quality and quantity
of the work, and from his decision there shall be no appeal, is binding upon the parties, and
constitutes the engineer the arbitrator or umpire between them" (citation omitted)).
88
509 N.E.2d 1271 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986).
89
Syl. pt. 1, id.; see also id at 1273 ("Unfortunately, the words 'arbitration' and 'appraisal'
are frequently used interchangeably without regard to their underlying legal meaning. Paragraph
15 [of the parties' agreement] clearly provides only for the valuation of any damage done to
crops by the drilling operations and no more. As such, the trial court was correct in finding that
Paragraph 15 provides for an appraisal and not for an arbitration." (citations omitted)).
86
8

90

Id.

9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 84 (2002) (citations omitted). The
parties can refer any "gateway" questions of arbitrability to arbitration. See Rent-A-Center, W.,
Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2777 (2010). In Forest Oil Corp. v. McAllen, 268 S.W.3d 51
(Tex. 2008), for example, the parties made the following agreement: "All disputes arising out of
or relating to the McAllen Ranch Leases, including, without in any way limiting the foregoing,
disputes relating to this Agreement or disputes over the scope of this arbitration clause, will be
resolved by arbitration in Houston, Texas, using three neutral arbitrators." Id. at 61 n.37. The
court held that:
91
92
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Generally, a contract cannot bind parties to arbitrate disputes they have
not agreed to arbitrate. 94 "While a contract cannot bind parties to arbitrate
disputes they have not agreed to arbitrate," however, '[i]t does not follow ...
that under the [FAA] an obligation to arbitrate attaches only to one who has
personally signed the written arbitration provision."' 95 "Rather," the Fourth
Circuit concluded, "a party can agree to submit to arbitration by means other
than personally signing a contract containing an arbitration clause." 96 Thus,
"[w]ell-established common law principles dictate that in an appropriate case a
nonsignatory can enforce, or be bound by, an arbitration provision within a
contract executed by other parties."9 7
In J.J.Ryan & Sons v. Rhone Poulenc Textile, S.A., 98 for example, the
Fourth Circuit explained that when allegations against "a parent company and
its subsidiary are based on the same facts and are inherently inseparable, a court
may refer claims against the parent to arbitration even though the parent is not
formally a party to the arbitration agreement." 99
In Olshan Foundation Repair & Waterproofing v. Otto,'oo Olshan had
entered into a contract with a homeowner to perform certain home repairs.' 0
The homeowner subsequently sold his home, and the new buyer also contracted

[t]his arbitration agreement .. . removes the 'scope determination' from the
court and places it with the arbitration panel. This provision, shrinking the
court's traditional role and expanding the arbitrators', is not challenged on
legal or public policy grounds. Accordingly, we have no discretion but to
direct the trial court to compel arbitration and stay McAllen's litigation.
Id. at 61 (footnotes omitted). Delegation of arbitrability questions can even be by incorporation
where the parties agree to arbitrate according to rules (like the American Arbitration Association
rules) that contain a self-delegation clause: "The majority of courts have concluded that express
incorporation of rules empowering the arbitrator to decide arbitrability (including ruling upon his
or her own jurisdiction) clearly and unmistakably evidences the parties' intent to delegate issues
of arbitrability to the arbitrator." Haddock v. Quinn, 287 S.W.3d 158, 172 (Tex. Ct. App. 2009).
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
94
United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960);
see also AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc'ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 648 (1986) (citations
omitted).
9
Int'l Paper Co. v. Schwabedissen Maschinen & Anlagen GMBH, 206 F.3d 411, 416 (4th
Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).
96
Id.

Id. at 416-17 (footnote omitted).

9

863 F.2d 315 (4th Cir. 1988).
Id. at 320-21; see also Long v. Silver, 248 F.3d 309, 320 (4th Cir. 2001) ("A non-signatory
may invoke an arbitration clause under ordinary state-law principles of agency or contract.");
Arnold v. Arnold Corp., 920 F.2d 1269, 1280-82 (6th Cir. 1990); cf Brantley v. Republic Mortg.
Ins. Co., 424 F.3d 392, 395-96 (4th Cir. 2005) (setting out test to determine when equitable
estoppel should apply against a signatory to an arbitration agreement).
9

9

0
101

276 S.W.3d 827 (Ky. Ct. App. 2009).
Id. at 828.
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with Olshan to perform more work before selling the home to a final buyer.'0 2
Both contracts contained a warranty and an arbitration clause.103 The final
buyer sought to enforce the warranty but refused to be bound by the arbitration
clause, arguing that he was not a signatory. 104 The trial court denied Olshan's
motion to compel arbitration.'0 5 On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed,
adopting the widely-followed rule from Thomson-CSF, S.A. v. American
Arbitration Ass'n,10 6 setting out "[fjive theories for binding nonsignatories to
arbitration agreements . . . : (1) incorporation by reference, (2) assumption

[where subsequent conduct indicates that it is assuming the obligation to
arbitrate], (3) agency, (4) veil-piercing/alter ego, and (5) estoppel."o 7 The court
held that the new homeowner was estopped from denying the arbitration clause
by virtue of having sought to enforce the same contract's warranty. 0 8
There is the potential for much federal common law on this issue as
well. In Gulf Oil Corp. v. Federal Power Commission, 0 9 Gulf and Texas
Eastern Transmission Company entered into a gas purchase agreement, which
contained an arbitration clause." 0 The Federal Power Commission ("FPC") had
issued Gulf a certificate of public convenience and necessity related to Gulf's
performance of the gas purchase agreement."' A dispute arose, and the FPC
ordered Gulf to make certain additional gas deliveries.1 2 Before the FPC, Gulf
invoked the agreement's arbitration clause and, arguing that its obligations
under the gas purchase agreement (presumably as determined by state law)
were coextensive with its obligations under the certificate, asked the FPC to
hold off its decision until the arbitrators had ruled." 3 The FPC refused.1 4 On
appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit sided with the FPC, holding

102
103
'0

"5
106
107

Id. at 828-29.
id.
Id. at 829.
Id. at 828.
64 F.3d 773 (2d Cir. 1995).
Olshan, 276 S.W.3d at 831 (citation omitted).

108 Id. at 831-32; see also Roby v. Corp. of Lloyd's, 996 F.2d 1353, 1360 (2d Cir. 1993)
("Courts in this and other circuits consistently have held that employees or disclosed agents of an
entity that is a party to an arbitration agreement are protected by that agreement." (citations
omitted)); Kepler Processing Co., LLC v. New Mkt. Land Co., No. 5:08-CV-00040, 2008 WL
4509377, at *6 (S.D. W. Va. Oct. 2, 2008) (party attempting to enforce agreement is estopped
from denying its arbitration clause).
109
563 F.2d 588 (3d Cir. 1977).
110

Id. at 596.

II Id.
112
id.
113

Id.

114

id
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that because the FPC was of course not a party to the gas purchase agreement,
it would not be bound by the results of arbitration, so there was no reason to
make it wait for the results of that process."'
F.

Independent Consideration

An arbitration clause need not be supported by independent
consideration. Although a party may not attack an arbitration clause on the
grounds that there is something wrong with the whole contract, he may defend
an arbitration clause by invoking a whole-contract defense.1 6
Similarly, while a party who chooses to attack an arbitration must
attack that clause independently, he may not do so by arguing that that clause is
unsupported by independent consideration. In other words, the promise to
arbitration is severable, but it does not constitute a wholly separate agreement
for all purposes. In Dan Ryan Builders, Inc. v. Nelson," 7 for example, the Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit certified a question to the Supreme Court of
Appeals of West Virginia: "Does West Virginia law require that an arbitration
provision, which appears as a single clause in a multi-clause contract, itself be
supported by mutual consideration when the contract as a whole is supported
by adequate consideration?""' 8 The state court answered the question in the
negative, holding that
[t]he formation of a contract with multiple clauses only
requires consideration for the entire contract, and not for each
individual clause. So long as the overall contract is supported
by sufficient consideration, there is no requirement of
consideration for each promise within the contract, or of
"mutuali
of obligation," in order for a contract to be
formed."

..
s

Id. at 596-97.

Compare, Forest Oil Corp. v. McAllen, 268 S.W.2d 51, 56 (Tex. 2008) ("While an
arbitration agreement procured by fraud is unenforceable, the party opposing arbitration must
show that the fraud relates to the arbitration provision specifically, not to the broader contract in
which it appears." (footnotes omitted)), with id.at 56-61 (holding that a whole-contract "waiver
unwritten
party's
of reliance" provision expressly disclaiming any reliance on the other
been
representations precluded independently attacking integral arbitration clause as having
fraudulently procured).
11
Dan Ryan Builders, Inc. v. Nelson, 737 S.E.2d 550 (W. Va. 2012).
116

..
8

Id. at 552.

Syl. pt. 6, id; see also Senior Mgmt., Inc. v. Capps, 240 F. App'x 550, 553 (4th Cir. 2007)
(applying North Carolina law that "[a] single consideration may support several promises; it is
not necessary that each promise have a separate consideration. Hence, a covenant which imposes
obligations upon one party only may be enforceable if it is part of an entire contract which is
supported by a sufficient consideration." (citation omitted)); Glazer v. Lehman Bros., Inc., 394
"9
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An alternative path to the same result holds that the mutual promises to
arbitrate are all the consideration that such an agreement might need.120 A few
states have held otherwise, 12 1 but the FAA preempts such a rule, especially in
states whose rule applies only to arbitration clauses.1 22
G.

Is the Arbitration Clause Itself Unconscionable Under State Law?

The most commonly seen tactic to avoid one's promise to arbitrate
must undoubtedly be the argument that that promise was "unconscionable." "A
fundamental rule of contract law holds that, absent fraud in the inducement, a
written agreement duly executed by the party to be held, who had an
opportunity to read it, will be enforced according to its terms."l23 In theory,
"[t]he doctrine of unconscionability has developed as a narrow exception to this

F.3d 444, 453 (6th Cir. 2005) ("[A]rbitration provisions, although severable insofar as they are
considered in determining whether a contractual dispute should be submitted to arbitration, are
not 'separate, independent and distinct contracts.' Although PrimaPaintclearly requires courts
to separately examine arbitration clauses, those clauses should not be considered as 'separate
contracts' outside of the underlying agreement."); Abdel Hakim Labidi v. Sydow, 287 S.W.3d
922, 926-27 (Tex. Ct. App. 2009) ("[Aln arbitration clause does not require mutuality of
obligation, so long as the underlying contract is supported by adequate consideration." (citation
omitted)). The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia hedged its position, however, and
held that where the parties' agreement to arbitrate lacked mutuality (for example, where
one
party agreed to arbitrate, but the other did not) might such a fact be considered in the overall
unconscionable analysis: "In assessing whether a contract provision is substantively
unconscionable, a court may consider whether the provision lacks mutuality of obligation. If a
provision creates a disparity in the rights of the contracting parties such that it is one-sided and
unreasonably favorable to one party, then a court may find the provision is substantively
unconscionable." Syl. pt. 10, Dan Ryan Builders, 737 S.E.2d 550. But see Wilkerson
ex rel.
Estate of Wilkerson v. Nelson, 395 F. Supp. 2d 281, 286-87 (M.D.N.C. 2005) (cataloguing
federal cases for proposition that "[t]he only reciprocal promise necessary for consideration is
that both parties agree to be bound by the rules of the arbitration procedure and its result,
irrespective of whose claims must be arbitrated" (citations omitted)).
120
See, e.g., Holloman v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 894 A.2d 547, 553 (Md. 2006) ("[M]utual
promises to arbitrate act as an independently enforceable contract ... each party has promised to
arbitrate disputes arising from an underlying contract, and 'each promise provides consideration
for the other."' (citation omitted)).
121
See, e.g., The Money Place, LLC v. Barnes, 78 S.W.3d 714, 717 (Ark. 2002) ("Contrary to
The Money Place's argument, mutuality within the arbitration agreement itself is required, and
that analysis depends on Arkansas contract law." (citation omitted)).
122
See, e.g., Enderlin v. XM Satellite Radio Holdings, Inc., No. 4:06-CV-0032, 2008 WL
830262, at * 10 (E.D. Ark. Mar. 25, 2008) ("The Court agrees with Defendants' contention that
Arkansas law requiring mutuality within the arbitration paragraph itself is preempted by the FAA
because it places the arbitration clause on unequal footing with other contract terms that do not
each have to be mutual. The Court heeds the Eighth Circuit's warning . . . that a doctrine
requiring separate consideration for arbitration clauses might violate federal policy.").
123
Conseco Fin. Serv. Corp. v. Wilder, 47 S.W.3d 335, 341 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001) (footnote
omitted).
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fundamental rule."l 24 Although the states all allow such a challenge and analyze
it under a more or less uniform framework, each state's judicial hostility toward

arbitration varies.125
The doctrine of unconscionability "is used by the courts to police the
excesses of certain parties who abuse their right to contract freely" and "is
directed against one-sided, oppressive and unfairly surprising contracts, and not
against the consequences per se of uneven bargaining power or even a simple
old-fashioned bad bargain."1 2 6 An unconscionable contract has been
characterized as "one which no man in his senses, not under delusion, would
make, on the one hand, and which no fair and honest man would accept, on the
other." 27
Courts typically attempt to measure "procedural" and "substantive"
unconscionability, and then ask whether the combination of both crosses some
(unstated) threshold.12
id
One state supreme court, for example, recently stated that after the Supreme Court of the
United States' decision in AT&TMobility LLC v. Concepcion precluding enforcement of a state's
policy invalidating a contractual waiver of class action on grounds of unconscionability, such a
waiver would now be subject to greater "procedural" scrutiny in that state and so should appear
in even larger, even bolder print. See Schnuerle v. Insight Commc'ns Co., L.P., 376 S.W.3d 561,
577 (Ky. 2012) ("In light of Concepcion, we are constrained to further note that in future cases
closer scrutiny of the positioning andprominence of class action waiverprovisions will likely be
necessary. Future application of Concepcion may be expected to limit the ability of consumers to
band together under state law in a class action to vindicate important rights. It therefore follows
that heightenedattention should be afforded to providing a full and clear disclosure when those
limitations are placed in adhesion contracts. It is fundamental that the prominence of the
disclosure should be commensurate with the importance of the right being taken away."
(emphasis added)).
124
125

Id. at 575 (citations omitted).
Id. (citations omitted).
128
See, e.g., id. at 575-76 (accepting that "review of arbitration clauses for unconscionability
involves a two step process-first, a review focused on the procedures surrounding the making of
the arbitration clause (procedural unconscionability) and second, a review of the substantive
content of the arbitration clause (substantive unconscionability)" (citation omitted)); Gillman v.
Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 534 N.E.2d 824, 828 (N.Y. 1988) ("A determination of
unconscionability generally requires a showing that the contract was both procedurally and
substantively unconscionable when made-i.e., 'some showing of an absence of meaningful
choice on the part of one of the parties together with contract terms which are unreasonably
favorable to the other party' (citations omitted)); Taylor Bldg. Corp. of Am. v. Benfield, 884
N.E.2d 12, 20 (Ohio 2008) ("The party asserting unconscionability of a contract bears the burden
of proving that the agreement is both procedurally and substantively unconscionable." (citations
omitted)); Salley v. Option One Mortg. Corp., 925 A.2d 115, 119 (Pa. 2007) ("The doctrine of
unconscionability has been applied in Pennsylvania as both a statutory and a common-law
defense to the enforcement of an allegedly unfair contract or contractual provision. This Court,
however, has not frequently discussed the common-law application. Nevertheless, we agree with
the general formulation which has been applied fairly consistently in the intermediate appellate
courts, and which borrows from the statutory version and is largely consonant with the Second
126

127
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Procedural unconscionability looks at the parties' relative bargaining
power, including their relative experience, expertise, sophistication, and so on;
whether the contract was one of adhesion;129 the form of the agreement; etc. 30
Restatement of Contracts. Under that formulation, a contract or term is unconscionable, and
therefore avoidable, where there was a lack of meaningful choice in the acceptance of the
challenged provision and the provision unreasonably favors the party asserting it. The aspects
entailing lack of meaningful choice and unreasonableness have been termed procedural and
substantive unconscionability, respectively." (citations omitted)); In re Olshan Found. Repair
Co., LLC, 328 S.W.3d 883, 892 (Tex. 2010) ("Texas law renders unconscionable contracts
unenforceable. Texas further recognizes both substantive and procedural unconscionability.
'Substantive unconscionability refers to the fairness of the arbitration provision itself, whereas
procedural unconscionability refers to the circumstances surrounding adoption of the arbitration
provision.'. . . Generally, a contract is unconscionable if, 'given the parties' general commercial
background and the commercial needs of the particular trade or case, the clause involved is so
one-sided that it is unconscionable under the circumstances existing when the parties made the
contract.' 'The principle is one of the prevention of oppression and unfair surprise and not of
disturbance of allocation of risks because of superior bargaining power."' (citations omitted));
Dan Ryan Builders, Inc. v Nelson, 737 S.E.2d 550, 558 (W. Va. 2012) ("'The doctrine of
unconscionability means that, because of an overall and gross imbalance, one-sidedness or lopsidedness in a contract, a court may be justified in refusing to enforce the contract as written. The
concept of unconscionability must be applied in a flexible manner, taking into consideration all
of the facts and circumstances of a particular case.' 'Under West Virginia law, we analyze
unconscionability in terms of two component parts: procedural unconscionability and substantive
unconscionability.' To be unenforceable, a contract term must-'at least in some small
measure'-be both procedurally and substantively unconscionable." (citations omitted)); Pittard
v. Great Lakes Aviation, 156 P.3d 964, 974 (Wyo. 2007) ("In deciding whether a contract is
unconscionable, we consider the claim from two perspectives. First, we consider whether the
contract provisions unreasonably favor one party over the other. Second, we consider whether the
latter party lacked a meaningful choice in entering into the contract. The first perspective
concerns the contract's substantive unconscionability. The second concerns its procedural
unconscionability. . . . [M]ost courts require evidence of both and take a balancing approach in
applying them. In other words, both the absence of meaningful choice and the presence of
contract provisions unreasonably favorable to one party must be found in order to sustain a claim
that a contract is unconscionable." (citation omitted)).
129
See, e.g., Conseco Fin. Serv. Corp. v. Wilder, 47 S.W.3d 335, 342 n.20 (Ky. Ct. App.
2001) ("A contract of adhesion is a standardized contract, which, imposed and drafted by the
party of superior bargaining strength, relegates to the subscribing party only the opportunity
to
adhere to the contract or reject it." (citation omitted)); cf Schnuerle, 376 S.W.3d at 576
("Adhesion contracts are not per se improper. On the contrary, they are credited with
significantly reducing transaction costs in many situations." (citations omitted)); Salley, 925 A.2d
at 119 ("[Mlerely because a contract is one of adhesion does not render it unconscionable and
unenforceable as a matter of law." (citations omitted)); State ex rel. Saylor v. Wilkes, 613 S.E.2d
914, 922 (W. Va. 2005) (recognizing "that it is likely that the bulk of the contracts signed in this
country are contracts of adhesion and are generally enforceable" (citation omitted)).
130
See, e.g., Schnuerle, 376 S.W.3d at 576 (procedural unconscionability asks,
for example,
whether the language at issue was "concealed in fine print and couched in vague or obscure
contractual language"); Conseco, 47 S.W.3d at 343 (finding arbitration clause not procedurally
unconscionable because "[t]he clause was not concealed or disguised within the form; its
provisions are clearly stated such that purchasers of ordinary experience and education are likely
to be able to understand it, at least in its general import; and its effect is not such as to alter the
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Substantive unconscionability looks at the resulting agreement: "As for
substantive unconscionability, courts consider 'the commercial reasonableness
of the contract terms, the purpose and effect of the terms, the allocation of the
risks between the parties, and similar public policy concerns.' 1 3 1 "Substantive
unconscionability 'refers to contractual terms that are unreasonably or grossly
favorable to one side and to which the disfavored party does not assent."'l32 An
arbitration agreement that only requires one party to arbitrate and allows the
other to sue, for example, is commonly alleged (and commonly unsuccessfully)
to be substantively unconscionable.13 3
Like every other effort to invoke the FAA's savings clause, a state's
law on unconscionability must not interfere with the FAA's goal to put
agreements to arbitrate on equal footing with other agreements.
IV. WHERE WEST VIRGINIA IS GOING IN THE FUTURE?

The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia will likely decide
many cases in the near future challenging oil and gas leases or the arbitration
provisions contained in those leases. The court should adopt a bright-line rule
in those cases to help lessors and lessees determine the validity of the
arbitration clauses contained in their leases. A clear rule will provide muchneeded stability to West Virginia's oil and gas jurisprudence and create an

principal bargain in an extreme or surprising way"); Taylor Bldg. Corp. of Am., 884 N.E.2d at
22-23 (Procedural unconscionability considers the circumstances surrounding the contracting
parties' bargaining, such as the parties' age, education, intelligence, business acumen
and
experience, who drafted the contract, whether alterations in the printed terms were possible, and
whether there were alternative sources of supply for the goods in question: "Factors which may
contribute to a finding of unconscionability in the bargaining process [i.e., procedural
unconscionability] include the following: belief by the stronger party that there is no reasonable
probability that the weaker party will fully perform the contract; knowledge of the stronger party
that the weaker party will be unable to receive substantial benefits from the contract; knowledge
of the stronger party that the weaker party is unable reasonably to protect his interests by reason
of physical or mental infirmities, ignorance, illiteracy or inability to understand the language of
the agreement, or similar factors." (citation omitted)).
131 See, e.g., Jenkins v. First Am. Cash Advance of Ga., LLC, 400 F.3d 868,
876 (11th Cir.
2005) (citation omitted).
132
Conseco, 47 S.W.3d at 342 n.22 (citation omitted); see also, e.g., Holmes v. Chesapeake
Appalachia, LLC, No. 5:11-CV-123, 2012 WL 3647674 (N.D. W. Va. Aug. 23, 2012) (rejecting
plaintiffs' unconscionability arguments and compelling arbitration, even of claims against nonmovants); Heller v. TriEnergy, Inc., 877 F. Supp. 2d 414 (N.D. W. Va. 2012) (rejecting argument
that equal-split arbitration cost sharing provision, absence of express "all relief' allowance, and
absence of equal waiver to jury are unconscionable; rejecting whole-contract fraudulent
inducement argument).
133 But see Conseco, 47 S.W.3d at 343-44 (noting that "there is no inherent reason to require
that the parties have equal arbitration rights" and rejecting argument that one-way arbitration is
unconscionable); see, e.g., Hathaway v. Eckerle, 336 S.W.3d 83, 88-90 (Ky. 2011) (applying
Conseco).
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environment that fosters investment and development in the oil and gas
industry. To establish a clear rule, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West
Virginia should recognize the fundamental right to contract and the liberality of
the FAA. Parties must be told what constitutes permissible arbitration language,
and they should be able to rely on bargained-for agreements. Only then can
lessors and lessees better protect their respective interests by better defining the
rights, responsibilities, and expectations with certainty.
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